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CHAPTER 8 
The Role of DFls in the Emerging 3.0 Responsible 
Funding Landscape – Responsible Corporate 
Governance and Beyond* 
Klaus Maurer** 
Abstract 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have been a major funder in microfi-
nance since the 1990s when they took over from donors and brought in a more 
commercial approach, coupled with much needed capacity building at all levels of 
the financial system. In their role as catalysts, DFIS have been successfully crowd-
ing in the private sector which has brought a fundamental change and diversity to 
the microfinance funding landscape. Most importantly, local deposits have 
emerged as the main source of funding which is encouraging as financial interme-
diation to a large extent replaces the channeling of cross-border funds.  
In equity finance, private social investors, mostly in the form of Microfinance 
Investment Vehicles (MIVs), increasingly take the place of DFIs and their stan-
dard-setting role in the governance of MFIs. Governance is perceived as a key risk 
in microfinance, as shown in the Microfinance Banana Skins surveys, with weak-
nesses prevailing in main governance areas such as clear ownership structure, dis-
closure and transparency, and the role and responsibilities of the board. Equity in-
vestors are not fully capitalizing on the opportunity to strengthen MFI governance. 
They must more actively engage in and beyond the board room and ensure ade-
quate qualifications, commitment and continuity of their board nominees. 
Several trends visible today are likely to gain momentum and shape the micro-
finance funding landscape of tomorrow: (i) public funding and subsidies for mi-
crofinance will decline further, (ii) local funding and especially local deposits will 
become the dominant funding source, (iii) more investors will shift from debt to-
wards equity finance (iv) the diversity of funders and their comparative advan-
tages provide a fertile ground for complementarity, and finally (v) the DFIs will 
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continue to play a role as catalysts and standard setters, albeit in a more indirect 
role from the back seat while MIVs and other intermediaries will be more in the 
driver seat.  
1 Introduction 
The microfinance industry has experienced a major upsurge in funding over the 
past couple of years. CGAP estimates that global cross-border funding in 2011 
was in the tune of US$ 25 billion. Development finance institutions (DFIs) have 
been and continue to be the largest group of funders in quantitative terms but per-
haps more important has been their impact beyond funding, i.e. their contribution 
in setting quality standards in many areas including corporate governance and re-
sponsible finance. With the rapid institutional change ongoing in the industry but 
also with the entry of private investors, the funding landscape is undergoing a fun-
damental change. This development raises a number of questions: With the crowd-
ing in of private investors, is the work of DFIs done? And if so, are DFIs ready to 
exit? Are the private investors able and willing to step into their shoes and can 
they maintain the impact beyond funding? Or do we rather see a complementarity 
of different types of investors, including the DFIs, for some time to come? Who 
will hold corporate governance in microfinance up to standard? These and other 
questions are being discussed in the following.  
The paper is structured in four parts. Section 2 provides an overview and analy-
ses the pattern of the microfinance funding landscape, characterizes the different 
investors and the complementarity of their funding, and places cross-border fund-
ing into perspective with local funding. Section 3 focuses on the specific role of 
development finance institutions (DFIs), their specific development role, and their 
important functions as standard-setters and catalysts of crowding in the private 
sector. Section 4 highlights the importance of good corporate governance, identi-
fies the key dimensions and discusses the current and future role of DFIs and pri-
vate investors in promoting good governance. Finally, section 5 sketches an out-
look to the future microfinance funding landscape, depicting four main trends. 
2 The Microfinance Funding Landscape 
2.1 Overview of Microfinance Funding  
With the growth and evolution of the global microfinance industry, funding of mi-
crofinance has increased substantially over the last decade and a highly diversified 
funding landscape has emerged. Today’s microfinance funding landscape can be 
broadly classified into foreign or cross-border funding on the one hand and local 
funding on the other hand, with public and private funders present on both sides, 
as shown in Chart 1 below. With Microfinance Investment Intermediaries (MIIs),  
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Fig. 1. The Microfinance Funding Landscape 
Source: based on CGAP 2010 
a new type of player has joined the scene in recent years. These intermediaries 
comprise Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) or funds as well as holding 
companies of MFI or microfinance bank networks.  
Obtaining a comprehensive and consistent picture of the funding flows to the 
microfinance industry remains a major challenge despite a number of laudable ini-
tiatives1 aimed at increasing the transparency of microfinance funding. Partly, this 
may be due to the fact that a large part of the microfinance industry is still unregu-
lated and hence not reporting to a central supervisor, and partly due to the large 
number of diverse funders who have entered the scene in recent years. The MFIs 
reporting to the MIX Market have debt outstanding from close to one thousand (!) 
different lenders (MBB 2012).  
2.2 Patterns and Trends of Cross-Border Funding 
Total cross-border funding commitments for microfinance has grown considerably 
to at least US$ 25 billion in 2011 according to CGAP estimates. Ten years ago, 
cross-border funding was almost exclusively provided by public funders. Even to-
day, public funders still account for the major share of about two thirds. But with 
microfinance becoming known as an attractive investment opportunity, private 
investors became a second important source of funding with a current estimated 
share of one third. Among 59 funders surveyed by CGAP in 2012, DFIs were still 
the largest group of cross-border funders in microfinance with a share of 55 %2, 
                                                          
1 The major initiatives comprise the annual funder survey by CGAP, the Funding Struc-
ture Reports by the MIX Market, MIV surveys by Symbiotics and MicroRate/Luminis.  
2 DFIs committed $9.3 billion out $17.5 billion total cross-border funding of 59 funders 
participating in the survey. 
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however, the DFIs’ share has been declining from over 60 % in the last three years 
with private funders increasing their stake.  
Funders use direct and indirect channels to support microfinance. The emer-
gence of specialized intermediaries – Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) 
and holdings – has provided a convenient facility for both public and private fun-
ders and fostered a trend towards indirect funding. In 2011, 37 % of total funding 
for refinancing was channeled via MIVs and holdings.  
Microfinance funding is being allocated to different uses or purposes. Refinanc-
ing of MFIs’ microcredit portfolios has been – and still is – the major purpose 
with 77 % of total cross-border funding (CGAP 2012). 15 % of funding is pro-
vided for capacity building, primarily at the institutional or micro level (MFIs) but 
also at the market infrastructure and policy levels (meso and macro).3  
Debt remains the main financial instrument with 55 % of total commitments in 
2011, but its share has been declining. This reduction is compensated by a grow-
ing share of equity investments, now reaching 16 %. Among MIVs, this trend to-
wards equity investments in MFIs has been even more pronounced with the share 
of equity doubling from 12 % in 2008 to 23 % in 2011 (Luminis 2012). Guarantees 
increased to 9 % while grants account for 15 %. Grants are primarily employed for 
capacity building while allocating grants to funding of microcredit portfolios has 
largely been phased out. 
The regional allocation of cross-border (predominantly public) funding is quite 
heterogenous while investments by (predominantly private) MIVs are concentrated 
in Eastern Europe/Central Asia and Latin America (74 % of investments), while Af-
rica, Asia and MENA are highly underserved in view of the potential demand.  
Funding in local currency presents a major challenge for cross-border funders 
who are generally not willing or able to absorb currency risk. Only 14 % of the 
direct debt is provided in local currency. MIVs fare better in making investments 
in local currency with a share of 28 %, the bulk of which was hedged through 
various mechanisms. Access to hedging facilities like TCX has enabled MIVs to 
make significant inroads to local currency investments. However, in the latest sur-
vey MIV managers named exchange rate volatility as the top factor hurting MIV 
performance in 2011 and perceive forex risk and hedging cost as the second main 
challenge for 2012. Expanding local currency funding will remain a key challenge 
going forward. In many markets, e.g. in the MENA region, cross-border funding 
may not be able to compete with local funding. 
2.3 Cross-Border Funders Under the Microscope 
The global attention and interest in microfinance over the past decade – and fur-
ther triggered by the 2005 UN Year of Microcredit and the nobel prize to M. 
Yunus and the Grameen Bank in 2006 – have attracted a variety of funders and  
                                                          
3 The purpose of the remaining 7 % of funding is unspecified.  
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Fig. 2. Spectrum of cross-border funders 
investors. They differ in objectives and motives, risk and return expectations, time 
horizon and instruments (see Chart 2) and can be briefly characterized as follows:  
x On the left side of the spectrum are purely public funders that are publicly 
owned and employ public funds. These comprise bi- and multilateral do-
nors such as BMZ, AFD or the IBRD. They combine social and develop-
ment objectives in their microfinance funding strategy but do not expect 
any financial return. The definition of “social return” used in this paper re-
fers to outreach and the social impact on the end-clients while “develop-
ment return” is focused on building institutions and financial systems as a 
stand-alone objective.  
x Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are publicly owned but employ 
primarily market funds or a blend of public and market funds, and hence, 
may be regarded as a hybrid institution. DFIs generally have social, devel-
opment and financial return expectations (“triple bottom line”). The em-
ployment of capital market funds determines the specific risk and (financial) 
return profile of DFIs and explains why DFIs prefer to invest in safe MFIs. 
x On the right side of the spectrum are the private investors which need to be 
differentiated. Among the private commercial investors there are probably 
very few who are investing in microfinance for purely financial returns. 
More prevalent are institutional commercial investors, like insurance com-
panies or pension funds, which take microfinance as an add-on into their 
portfolios for reasons or corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
x The majority of the newly entering private investors are socially responsi-
ble investors with a truly double bottom line perspective, i.e. they combine 
financial returns (with the view of sustainability) and social returns (in 
terms of outreach and social benefits for the end-clients). Social investors 
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generally do not explicitly pursue the development objective of building in-
stitutions and financial systems.  
x MIVs and holdings have emerged as new type of players in the microfi-
nance funding landscape and function as intermediaries between asset 
owners and MFIs. At the end of 2011, there were 115 MIVs with total as-
sets of US$ 7.7 billion (Luminis 2012). Overall, 35 % of MIV funding 
originated from public and 65 % from private investors. Many MIVs repre-
sent a hybrid form where the line between public and private is blurred, e.g. 
private investor funds with a public guarantee. Some MIVs are set up as 
public private partnerships, e.g. EFSE or MEF, but there are presumably 
also many MIVs with private investors only.4 MIVs are managed by spe-
cialized fund managers and investment advisors. Holdings are network 
structures of either existing or greenfield MFIs or microfinance banks, for 
example the ProCredit Holding with 21 microfinance banks.5  
The different types of investors also differ in terms of risk appetite which is highest 
among donors and lowest among private commercial investors. In terms of invest-
ment perspectives, public funders clearly have the longest horizon, private commer-
cial investors the shortest. Each type of investor by nature has its strengths and 
weaknesses. The long-term horizon of public funders brings stability but public 
funds are generally scarce while commercial funds from private investors are not 
limited, at least in principle, but their short-term horizon brings the risk of volatility. 
The comparative advantages of different investors can also be read from the 
type of instruments they provide. While private investors prefer to offer senior 
(i.e.low-risk) loans with short tenors for refinancing of MFI loan portfolios, do-
nors offer grant funds for long-lasting investments in capacity building and sys-
tems development. DFIs, and recently also MIVs, tend to provide subordinate 
loans, guarantees and equity finance.  
Instruments differ greatly in terms of their leverage effect. The leverage tends 
to be greatest on the left side of the spectrum, e.g. one dollar spent on capacity 
building might produce a leverage factor 10, and lowest on the very right side, e.g. 
one dollar expended as one-year loan for refinancing microloans may generate a 
leverage factor 1 or 2. In between these two poles, a number of high-leverage in-
struments exist such as equity (with a leverage factor of 8 to 10 depending on the 
regulatory environment), sub-debt and other hybrid forms.6 Scarce public funds 
should therefore maximize their leverage effect. 
                                                          
4 There were no data available on the number and share of purely private MIVs.  
5 Other such holdings are Access, Advans, Microcred, and more recently Finca. The 
greenfield model is discussed in more detail in section 3.  
6 The various funder surveys by CGAP and others do not reflect this leverage effect. 
Funding provided through different instruments by different investors is simply added 
up indiscriminately, thus, clouding the real picture. 
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Overall, the spectrum is fluid and there are no clear cuts between the different 
types of investors but rather overlaps. However, the differentiation of investors, 
their objectives and return expectations, their investment horizon and their specific 
instruments prepares the ground for an emerging complementarity of public and 
private funders. 
2.4 Local Funding for Microfinance  
Although comprehensive and consistent data on local funding sources are still 
lacking, it is evident from existing data sources that local funding for microfinance 
has become the primary source of funding, much more important than cross-
border funding. This structural change in funding was induced by the changing 
landscape of microfinance service providers. NGO-MFIs have lost their role as the 
primary vehicle for microlending, while the relative importance of banks and non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) has increased. As banks and in some legisla-
tions also NBFIs are allowed to take deposits, local deposits have advanced to the 
single most important source of funding in microfinance.  
Aggregate MIX Market data provide some order of magnitudes. In 2011, a total 
of 2,656 MFIs reported total assets of about US$ 115 billion and an aggregate loan 
portfolio of almost US$ 78 billion. Local deposits mobilized by the same institutions 
reached US$ 69 billion, or 60 % of total assets and over 88 % of the loan portfolio. 
The remaining US$ 46 billion or 40 % of assets comprise debt and equity. Earlier 
analyses found that 60 % of debt financing was from local lenders, primarily com-
mercial banks (MBB 2011). Hence, it is safe to conclude that overall some 84 % of 
total funding to MFIs originates from local sources, and the balance 16 % or about 
US$ 18 to 19 billion from cross-border funders which is largely in line with the re-
sults from the funder surveys presented in the previous section.7 
The trend towards local deposit mobilization as the primary source of funding 
is even more visible in the leading MFIs in the world. The 20 institutions8 listed in 
Table 1 below combine a loan portfolio of US$ 25 billion and thus represent one 
third of the universe, serve 40 million borrowers and 60 million depositors. The 
results are illustrative when looking at the ratio of deposits to loans (bolded col-
umn): In almost half of the cases, local deposits are sufficient to refinance the en-
tire loan portfolios of those institutions. For institutions like Grameen Bank, 
Acleda Bank or even ProCredit, this picture was unthinkable only ten years ago. 
The major exception is India at the bottom of the list where credit-only MFIs with 
funding from local commercial banks have expanded outreach to millions of bor-
rowers but have so far been prevented by a very conservative Reserve Bank of In-
dia to accept deposits. 
                                                          
7 After subtracting the funding provided for capacity building. 
8 ProCredit is included as the group of 21 banks.  
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In view of building inclusive financial systems, this development is encourag-
ing in many respects. The shift – in relative terms – from channeling cross-border 
funds to strengthening local financial intermediation brings stability and reduces 
the exposure of MFIs and borrowers to currency risk. It clearly confirms that sav-
ings are an essential financial service, especially for the poor. In 2011, aggregate 
MIX Market data recorded 88 million borrowers and an almost identical number 
of 88 million small savers. For the MFIs, the mobilization of local deposits brings 
self-sufficiency in funding and imposes greater discipline and prudence in lending 
operations. In the medium to long term, relatively cheaper local deposits will 
lower the cost of funds which can be passed on as benefit to the borrowers. 

















Bangladesh Grameen Bank 1.0 1.6 159 % 6,610 8,340 1.3 
Indonesia BRI 3.9 5.9 151 % 4,500 19,600 4.4 
Colombia Banca Caja Social 3.0 3.8 127 % 625 5,200 8.3 
Kenya Equity bank 1.3 1.5 115 % 638 5,700 8.9 
Cambodia Acleda Bank 1.0 1.1 110 % 272 822 3.0 
Bolivia Prodem 0.5 0.5 101 % 116 688 5.9 
SSA, ECA, LAC ProCredit Group 5.2 4.8 92 % 558 3,400 6.1 
Bolivia Bancosol 0.6 0.5 91 % 169 485 2.9 
Peru Mibanco 1.6 1.4 88 % 435 571 1.3 
Bolivia Banco FIE 0.6 0.5 84 % 176 477 2.7 
Mongolia XAC Bank 0.4 0.3 66 % 77 382 5.0 
Peru Creditscotia 1.2 0.7 57 % 714 529 0.7 
Azerbaijan Access Bank 0.4 0.2 47 % 118 110 0.9 
Mexico Compartamos 0.8 0.4 43 % 2,300 18 0.0 
Bangladesh BRAC 0.6 0.3 42 % 4,960 6,800 1.4 
Bangladesh ASA 0.7 0.2 24 % 4,420 6,482 1.5 
India Bandan 0.6 0.0 2 % 3,850 0 0.0 
India SKS 0.3 0.0 0 % 3,946 0 0.0 
India Spandana 0.6 0.0 0 % 3,364 0 0.0 
India Share 0.4 0.0 0 % 2,160 0 0.0 
TOTAL  24.7 23.5 95 % 40,008 59,604 1.5 
Source: Own compilation, based on MIX Market data for 2011  
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Despite the primacy of local funding, cross-border funders will continue to have a 
role to play. The challenge is rather to seek complementarity of local and cross-
border funding along comparative advantages in terms of the different instruments 
offered to the microfinance sector. It is clear that refinancing of MFI portfolios 
will be assumed by local sources in local currency, primarily local deposits, or in 
case of non-deposit-taking MFIs by local financial institutions. For example, India 
and Morocco are prominent examples where local commercial banks account for 
























Fig. 3. Complementarity of cross-border and local funders  
Cross-border funding is most needed for longer-term refinancing, subordinated 
and hybrid forms of finance such as mezzanine as well as guarantees, as the local 
capital markets are still underdeveloped. Equity remains a crucial area where 
cross-border investors have a role to play in view of the governance that comes 
with it. Finally, capacity building will be required at all levels of the financial sys-
tem where cross-border funders have an important role by bringing international 
good practices and standards. 
3 Impact Beyond Funding: Role of DFls in Promoting an 
Inclusive Financial System and a Responsible Finance 
Landscape  
DFIs have engaged with microfinance programs and institutions globally, taking 
the lead in the early 1990s from donor agencies that have been supporting micro-
                                                          
9 India due to priority sector lending. 
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finance initiatives in the early phases. The DFIs assumed the risk of a sector that 
had an unproven business model, bringing in a more commercial approach, cou-
pled with much needed capacity building and technical know-how.  
Beyond this quantitative lead, DFIs have had – and continue to have – an im-
portant qualitative role in the funding landscape and have had an impact on the 
development of microfinance which extends beyond funding. At least three impor-
tant functions of DFIs should be highlighted: (i) their role as “development inves-
tors” focused on building inclusive financial systems at macro, meso and micro 
levels, (ii) their role as standard setter, e.g. in corporate governance, responsible 
finance and other fields, and (iii) their role as catalyst and match-maker by crowd-
ing in private sector institutions. 
3.1 Development Role: Capacity Building for Financial Systems 
Development 
DFIs perform a crucial function in the development of financial systems by build-
ing capacity at the macro, meso and micro level. This development role clearly 
distinguishes DFIs from private investors, even socially responsible investors, and 
from most MIVs.  
DFIs engage at the policy (macro) level and work with lawmakers, govern-
ments, regulators towards creating a conducive framework for finance in general 
and microfinance in particular. At the meso level, DFIs support the development 
of the financial sector infrastructure. The IFC, for example, has been active in set-
ting up credit bureaus in several countries and has recently supported the estab-
lishment of mobile banking platforms. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, KfW and 
USAID were instrumental in setting up the deposit insurance which has boosted 
the confidence among small savers to deposit their money in local banks. Another 
prominent example is the Currency Exchange Fund (TCX), a hedging facility set 
up in 2007 by a group of leading DFIs which has since played a key role in ex-
panding local currency funding.  
At the micro level, DFIs have significantly contributed to institution building of 
banks and MFIs. To this end, DFIS have pursued a three-pronged strategy of down-
scaling of commercial banks, transformation of MFIs and setting up of greenfield 
microfinance banks. Through debt and equity investments coupled with technical 
assistance many commercial banks were introduced to lending to micro, small and 
medium enterprises (MSMEs) and after a phase of learning and experimentation 
have been convinced of the business case of MSME finance. DFIs played a key role 
in the transformation of former NGO-MFIs into successful microfinance banks 
which are regarded as the leading players such as Acleda Bank in Cambodia, XAC 
Bank in Mongolia and Compartamos in Mexico, to name a few.  
But the model which DFIs are most prominently associated with, is the estab-
lishment of greenfield microfinance banks. The first bank was founded in the mid-
1990s and today the model is well-known: Several DFIs join forces and form a 
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club of reputable shareholders, and jointly with a strong technical partner prepare 
and set up a specialized bank for microfinance. During the start-up phase, the 
technical partner provides management and technical advisory services. The ex-
perience has shown that, within two to three years, a Greenfield bank can reach 
break even.  
ProCredit has been the precursor of this model (Laude 2009) with meanwhile 
21 microbanks newly established on three continents over the past fifteen years. In 
a second stage, the banks were subsumed under a holding company where again 
DFIs have been key shareholders. In the process, many DFIs swapped their earlier 
shareholdings in the retail banks with a stake in the holding company. In the 
meantime, the model has been replicated by other technical operators which have 
created holding companies with DFI participation: Access, Advans, Microcred, 
Swiss Microfinance Holding. Together with ProCredit Holding, these five hold-
ings today control 42 microbanks serving 1.2 million borrowers with a combined 
loan portfolio of US$ 6 billion and 4.3 million savers with a deposit volume of 
US$ 4.8 billion. This is a remarkable achievement in terms of sustainable massive 
outreach in a relatively short period of time. The banks are spread across Eastern 
Europe, Africa and Latin America while the whole of Asia and the MENA region 
have so far not been a target for the greenfield model. Furthermore, international 
MFI networks like Opportunity International, Finca and CHF have recently 
adopted a similar model of transforming retail MFIs into for-profit companies un-
der a holding structure, some with participation of DFIs.  
DFIs also provided a major impulse in the field of product development beyond 
microfinance. They have been pioneering into green finance including energy ef-
ficiency, agricultural finance and more recently education finance. In many coun-
tries, banks and other financial institutions have integrated these products into 
their portfolio. 
3.2 Setting Standards in Good Governance and Responsible Finance 
Impact beyond funding has also been achieved through standard setting in the young 
industry, and DFIs have played a leading role in many areas. Promoting good corpo-
rate governance has been one of the areas where DFIs have set standards across the 
industry through their engagement as shareholders in the transformation of MFIs 
and in the greenfield model described above. The promotion of good governance is 
the special focus of this paper and is discussed in the next section. 
Closely linked to good governance is the area of responsible finance where 
DFIs have been equally instrumental in setting standards and promoting industry 
norms and codes. Responsible finance is being understood in a wider sense than 
social performance and client protection.10 DFIs, and specifically the IFC, were 
                                                          
10 The term “responsible finance” first appeared in February 2008 as the lead theme of a 
conference organized by KfW and Frankfurt School of Finance and Management. 
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the first to set do no harm standards and introduce environmental and social ex-
clusion lists. Anti-money laundering requirements and integrity standards are fur-
ther important elements in a responsible finance framework. These insertions have 
become important building blocks of the bridge between the microfinance industry 
and the global ESG (Environment-Social-Governance) standards adopted by the 
mainstream finance and investment industry.  
The holdings, international MFI networks and the MIVs have become a prime 
platform for DFIs for putting responsible finance on the agenda, thereby reaching 
out to a large network of retail microfinance institutions. For example, the Euro-
pean Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE) as one of the largest MIV where all major 
DFIs are invested conducted a series of high-level responsible finance events 
jointly with the central banks in several Eastern European countries. EFSE’s De-
velopment Facility was the first to conduct an in-depth study on over-indebtedness 
in the microfinance sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and further research in 
other countries has followed since.  
3.3 Catalyst and Matchmaker: Crowding in the Private Sector Through 
Public Private Partnerships  
The most important and powerful function of DFIs is their catalyst role of foster-
ing the entry of private sector institutions into areas considered as high risk or un-
profitable. This is done through demonstrations (“lighthouse examples”), capacity 
building and effectively enhancing the institutional governance of their investee 
companies as shown above, but also through various forms of public private part-
nerships and arrangements. 
The prime comparative advantage of DFIs lies in their enhancement power 
which derives from the AAA-Rating that most DFIs have. This allows them to 
provide credit enhancement in financing structures, e.g. subordinate tranches, as 
well as guarantees which are considered first-class by regulators across the world. 
In many financing structures which at first sight appear to be private market trans-
actions DFIs have taken catalytic positions by providing enhancement. BOLD 
(BlueOrchard Loans for Development 2006–1)11, the first collateralized loan obli-
gation (CLO) in microfinance in 2006 is just one example where a DFI, the Dutch 
FMO in this case, took a crucial first loss position and made the structure feasible.  
As outlined above, over the past ten years DFIs have increasingly taken cata-
lytic positions in holdings and MIVs. In most cases, they take a subordinate stake, 
typically the mezzanine piece, thus catalyzing private investors who opt for the 
senior and lower risk tranches. This has been the model for public private fund 
structures like EFSE, REGMIFA, MEF and others. Interestingly, DFIs act as a 
catalyst not only for private investors but, in their mezzanine position, also vis-à-
                                                          
11 BOLD raised a total amount of USD 99.1 million for loans disbursed to 21 MFIs, in 13 
different countries, and 5 different currencies. 
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vis purely public investors and donors who value the leverage power and regard 
the DFIs as the ‘middlemen’ to the private sector and the link to the capital mar-
kets. When providing valuable first loss funding, some bilateral donors make it a 
condition that DFIs provide mezzanine investment on top or in parallel.  
The participation of DFIs in wholesale structures or retail institutions brings 
reputation and credibility for the investees and provides a quality seal for other 
investors and especially for regulators. The fact that a MFI has undergone a thor-
ough due diligence by a DFI is frequently perceived as an entry signal to MIVs 
and private investors. Most importantly, however, is the DFIs’ clout in the nego-
tiations with regulators. The experience with transformation of MFIs and setting 
up greenfield microbanks has proven that the presence of DFIs as reputable share-
holders – direct in the retail institution or indirect via a holding – is crucial for ob-
taining a license as a deposit-taking institution where shareholders need to be ap-
proved by the regulator. While socially responsible investors and MIVs may be 
well-known in the microfinance community, they are a blank page for most regu-
lators, to say the least. Some regulators are “reluctant” to “suspicious” to approve 
“investment funds with strange names” as shareholders of banks.12 On the other 
hand, as the regulatory environment is not always conducive, the presence of DFIs 
brings protection for retail MFIs in dealing with the authorities and is very useful 
in assuring a smooth relationship in volatile political environments.  
Crowding in of the private sector is a main pillar in the mandate and raison d’etre 
of the DFIs. It is intended and encouraged as it demonstrates the sustainability of the 
business model, and often made a condition for DFI engagement. And the DFIs’ role 
and presence is generally valued by the private investors. Despite good intentions, 
the relationship between DFIs and private investors is occasionally exposed to 
some tension. The debate revolves around three contentious issues which are 
closely interrelated: (i) technical assistance, (ii) the different roles of public and 
private investors, and (iii) exit. 
On (i) technical assistance and capacity building, private investors are some-
what ambiguous. On the one hand, they value the much needed capacity building 
and technical know-how provided by DFIs in the development stage of MFIs which 
has brought many institutions to the level of investor-readiness. On the other hand, 
DFIs are perceived to have a competitive advantage in terms of offering capacity 
building programs and technical assistant packages as “deal sweeteners” which does 
not necessarily level the playing field (Sanyoura and Espejo 2011). While the criti-
cism may be valid for single cases, closing down technical assistance by DFIs would 
be like throwing out the child with the bathwater. More encouraging is the trend 
among several private investors and MIVs of setting up their own technical assis-
tance facilities for capacity building of their investees. Many investors have real-
ized only during the financial crisis that even well-performing 1st tier and 2nd tier 
MFIs urgently need institutional strengthening – beyond financial investments 
alone – in areas such as risk management and internal controls.  
                                                          
12 Personal communication with supervisors from two central banks. 
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Behind the second issue, concerning the different roles of public and private in-
vestors, is the view expressed by some private investors that DFIs have been slow 
to adapt to the growing appetite of private investors to engage and provide funding 
for the microfinance sector, not making enough room for the private investors. In 
the case of senior loans, there seems to be an overlap of DFI funding and private 
investors in view of the growing yet still limited number of MFIs ready to absorb 
commercial funding. This could lead to an over-supply of funds to certain market 
segments, while there is still much unmet demand in others. The critics say that 
DFIs continue to invest in mature 1st and 2nd tier MFIs while they should make 
room for the private investors and move “downstream” to small 3rd and 4th tier in-
stitutions because DFIs should be assuming the risks that private investors are still 
not willing or able to assume. The counter-argument is that DFIs, albeit being 
public-owned institutions, employ capital market funds and hence need to main-
tain a certain standard of credit risk rating, thereby inducing the tendency to stay 
within a relatively conservative circle of mature and well-performing MFIs. This 
is further reinforced by the DFIs’ limitations – given their operating cost structures 
– of making small ticket investments as needed by early stage MFIs. These risk 
and cost considerations prevent DFIs from expand the frontier beyond a certain 
limit. Going forward, it will be important to ensure that there is no overlap but 
complementarity. 
This discussion leads to the third issue, exit by DFIs. Long-term commitment in 
a certain geographic region or a certain sector is crucial to any DFI’s development 
mission. Especially during the financial crisis of 2008 when private investors sig-
nificantly reduced their commitments, the DFIs’ motto “we are here to stay” was 
welcome and appropriate. The DFIs’ ability to act as lenders of last resort und thus 
help stabilize unsettled funding markets is recognized also by private investors 
who generally have a much shorter investment horizon than DFIs. The theory is 
straight-forward: When a MFI has the capacity to mobilize resources from finan-
cial markets by the quality of its financial statements, the aim of the DFI may be 
considered as having been reached. It is then time for the DFI to withdraw. It is 
then desirable for it to recycle its equity investment and allow its client to bring in 
carefully selected private institutional investors. This will undoubtedly make the 
mission more sustainable. (Laude 2009) However, in practice it is not always ob-
vious – particularly when it comes to equity positions. The case for debt, espe-
cially short-term senior debt to refinance microcredit portfolios, is clear: in many 
cases the time is right to now leave the field to the private sector and especially to 
local fund providers including depositors.  
The situation is more complex with equity investments. While DFIs may have 
an initial investment horizon of say eight years, there seem to be little or no spe-
cific internal guidelines in terms of the stage of the investment at which a DFI 
should exit. As a consequence, DFIs tend to stay longer than anticipated (Sany-
oura and Espejo 2011).13 The governance role associated with an equity invest-
                                                          
13 More research would be required to firmly substantiate this statement. 
The Role of DFls in the Emerging 3.0 Responsible Funding Landscape 169 
 
ment adds a further dimension and raises the question of responsible exit strate-
gies to be discussed below.  
The ongoing trend in the greenfield model of DFIs consolidating their individ-
ual equity stakes in retail microbanks into one larger stake at the holding level can 
be seen as a first stage of exit. In addition, this “upstream” consolidation brings 
cost savings through economies of scale. Occasionally, however, a DFI is already 
invested at the holding level and yet takes another major stake in a retail 
greenfield bank newly to be established under the same holding. This is useful in 
order to create value at holding level; however it is critical for DFIs to consider 
when to exit the affiliate, once it has matured and reached full sustainability. 
3.4 Future Role of DFIs 
Financial systems in most countries are far from being inclusive. The work is not 
done and, going forward, DFIs will have a role to play. DFIs need to sharpen their 
instruments and interventions, strictly adhering to their comparative advantages 
and additionality: remain a development investor, standard-setter and catalyst. 
This is when DFIs achieve the greatest impact beyond funding. 
DFIs can provide additionality in funding by developing and providing a vari-
ety of financing instruments so far not offered by private investors, for example 
subordinate and mezzanine finance, guarantees and other enhancement products. 
There is a role for building local capital and bond markets to allow such products 
to be offered locally in the medium and long term.  
DFIs continue to have a role as equity investors, at least in the back seat of 
MIVs and holdings. Especially in deposit-taking institutions where regulators look 
for reputable shareholders before granting a license DFIs can offer additionality in 
credibility and standing. MIVs, particularly closed-ended equity funds are often 
not the preferred candidates as shareholders in banks as they are less able to re-
spond to a capital call in an emergency. When MIVs have the backing of DFIs, the 
notion of patient capital and deep pockets are convincing factors.  
Should DFIs move “downstream” to smaller 3rd and 4th tier MFIs? The answer 
would be: generally no, for three reasons. Firstly, it is not their comparative advan-
tage to work directly with very small and high-risk MFIs for reasons mentioned ear-
lier. DFIs have started to delegate this work to privately managed MIVs and hold-
ings in which they invest, and these are more agile and flexible in dealing with 
smaller institutions. Secondly, the business case has been made that microfinance is 
a sustainable and profitable venture in the pioneering work by the DFIs since the 
1990s. Especially the greenfield model has shown that microfinance banks set up as 
a franchise can reach profitability within 2 to 3 years. Also, DFIs have demonstrated 
how to develop and transform small MFIs into successful profitable operations. In 
this respect, the demonstration work of DFIs is done, and the time is right for the 
private sector to replicate the approach. Thirdly, there is a general trend among DFIs 
to move “upstream” and focus resources and effort on the specialized intermediaries, 
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i.e. MIVs and holdings. This trend is also visible in the DFI funding flows: the share 
of indirect funding through MIVs and holdings increased from 38 % (2007) to 48 % 
(2011). It is clear that DFIs are increasingly taking the backseat and invite MIVs, 
holdings and their managers to take the driver seats. 
Could or should these private sector vehicles not take over the breeding of 
small existing or new MFIs? In fact, early initiatives in this regard are emerging. 
Several MIVs formed a working group in 2011 to explore ways and means to sup-
port smaller MFIs. The group plans to build a directory of 2nd and 3rd tier MFIs, to 
reflect on foreign exchange hedging and small transactions sizes, and to coordi-
nate much-needed technical assistance (e-MFP 2011). With the development blue 
print on the table, the demonstration of the business case done, the know how and 
tools available, the case and the vision for private venture capital to take over may 
be ripe: It is time for the sector to come to terms with the reality that more venture 
capital type investors are needed to ramp up the business model in order for it to 
become truly mainstream. (Sanyoura and Espejo 2011) 
4 Special Focus: Promoting Good Corporate Governance  
4.1 Why Is Corporate Governance so Important in Microfinance?  
The quality of corporate governance is a key factor – and also a key risk – for the 
performance of MFIs. Some piece of evidence to support this is annual Microfi-
nance Banana Skins’ survey conducted among several hundred microfinance prac-
titioners, analysts and regulators. Since the first survey in 2008, corporate govern-
ance has consistently ranked high on the scale of perceived risks. In the latest sur-
vey in 2012, it ranked second overall (see Chart 4) while some key stakeholders – 
regulators and investors – even named corporate governance as the number one 




























































Fig. 4. Corporate Governance in Microfinance Banana Skins Surveys 
The Role of DFls in the Emerging 3.0 Responsible Funding Landscape 171 
 
The growing importance of corporate governance is also induced by the ongoing 
transformation of the microfinance sector and the resulting institutional change. 
Many MFIs are in transition to larger and more professional institutions with a 
more differentiated organizational structure, delegation of authority and wider ar-
ray of checks and balances. As the institutions mature, they gradually formalize 
functions previously executed informally, in their boards, their management and 
among their staff.  
In particular, the transformation of MFIs into deposit-taking institutions de-
mands greater responsibility and prudence where strong shareholders, a solid capi-
tal basis and good governance are key factors, on the one hand. On the other hand, 
by being able to offer a wider range of services, especially savings, MFIs expand 
their client outreach to poorer segments who do not have the capacity for micro-
credit. In this respect, good governance is directly linked to client outreach and 
social performance. 
Finally, good governance is central to the overall performance of an MFI. In a 
recent pilot project, the MIX tested a new set of governance indicators among a 
sample of 162 MFIs across 57 countries. Reporting on these indicators showed a 
positive correlation among factors such as the presence of risk management func-
tions, internal auditing, and Board committees, suggesting that good MFI govern-
ance procedures do not exist in isolation from each other (Pistelli et al. 2012)
BANEX in Nicaragua is an example where more effective governance could 
have mitigated the impact or even averted failure (McKee 2012). Other examples 
show that crises and financial distress can create huge additional strains on gov-
ernance.  
4.2 Principles, Dimensions and Areas of Good Corporate Governance  
Broadly defined by the OECD, corporate governance involves a set of relation-
ships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance issued 
in 1999 have become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, 
corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They focus on the following key 
dimensions: (i) ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance frame-
work including legal and regulatory requirements, (ii) key ownership functions 
and the rights of shareholders and their equitable treatment, (iii) disclosure and 
transparency, and (iv) responsibilities of the board. The Financial Stability Forum 
has designated the OECD Principles as one of the twelve key standards for sound 
financial systems.  
An effective corporate governance framework should promote transparency 
and efficiency, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division 
of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement au-
thorities (OECD 2004). The internal governance framework comprises – in addi-
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tion to the board as the key element – different organs and actors, including spe-
cific board committees, executive management, risk management separated from 
operations and an independent internal audit. In addition to the key governance 
dimensions listed above, corporate governance covers a wide range of areas such 
as internal and external reporting (linked to the dimension of disclosure and trans-
parency), non-financial and financial incentive structures including compensation 
schemes, addressing conflicts of interest, internal systems of accountability, code 
of conduct among staff and several more. From the range of areas it becomes clear 
that the topic of governance is multi-facetted and, while there are generally ac-
cepted principles, the governance structure in an organization also has to fit to the 
business culture of that organization.  
Governance in microfinance is inherently more complex than in other sectors 
due to the industry’s implicit double bottom line. In recent years, governance has 
become a prime topic for research and discussion and a growing consensus on 
principles of good corporate governance has emerged in the industry, both on the 
importance of good governance – as reflected in the results of the Microfinance 
Banana Skins Surveys – as well as on their implementation – as reflected in sev-
eral implementation guidelines and tools published recently.14 However, recent 
research has revealed a considerable gap between the ideal of effective MFI gov-
ernance and the reality on the ground (CGAP 2012). Some of these shortcomings 
relate to the key dimensions of governance selected for further discussion: owner-
ship and shareholder structure, the role of the board and shareholder exit. 
4.3 Clear Ownership Structure and Shareholder Rights  
Good corporate governance starts with clear ownership. This provides the essen-
tial basis for accountability and responsibility in an organization. The absence of 
clear ownership and an often diffuse stakeholder structure have been inherent 
weaknesses of NGO-MFIs, and with it, the greatest vulnerability of a large part of 
the microfinance industry. In the past, most MFIs have been incorporated as foun-
dations, trust funds or associations, i.e. all of them legal forms with no real own-
ers. Over the years, these institutions have accumulated donor grants which were 
further grown by retained earnings into a sizable capital base which one might 
want to call “donorship”. The transformation of “donorship” into real ownership 
remains a key challenge for NGO-MFIs. In most cases, it involves a complex, 
painful and lengthy process. Several examples of a successful transformation ex-
ist, e.g. Bancosol in Bolivia, Acleda in Cambodia or Compartamos in Mexico, but 
in many environments NGO-MFIs are struggling with legal and/or political obsta-
cles. In countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Egypt and lately Iraq the 
transformation process has been stalled for years. 
                                                          
14 These include Rock et al 1998, CMEF 2012, Fundación Mikrofinanzas BBVA 2011, 
IFC 2010, Vita and Gonzalez 2011.  
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The greenfield approach pursued by DFIs in cooperation with strong technical 
partners over the past decade has been straightforward in terms of ownership. The 
key element and a major success factor of this approach has been the gathering of 
strategic and like-minded shareholders with common objectives, primarily DFIs15 
and lately also private socially responsible investors. This club of DFI sharehold-
ers has enacted a highly effective governance structure, initially through direct 
shareholding and board membership in the early greenfield operations and today 
largely in an indirect manner via the respective holding company. 
The DFIs have been the pioneers in microfinance equity investments, and 
through this ownership participation have had a key role in promoting good corpo-
rate governance through active engagement. Even today, DFIs are still the largest 
equity investors with US$2.3 billion in microfinance equity in 2011 (CGAP 
2012). However, in the rapidly changing funding landscape MIVs have grown to 
become the second most important source of equity capital with almost US$ one 
billion in 2011 (Symbiotics 2012).  
4.4 Role and Responsibilities of the Board  
A key element of good governance is the functional separation of board and man-
agement. The guiding concept is a two-tier system of accountability where a su-
pervisory body holds an executive body accountable for performance. The chal-
lenges are (i) to structure an effective board in terms of size, composition, qualifi-
cation, responsibilities, compensation, adoption of a conflict of interest policy, and 
with the right balance of governance and management, and (ii) to structure effec-
tive board processes including the preparation and conduct of meetings, decision-
making etc. 
The reality on the ground is still far from this ideal and many MFIs have a long 
way to go in order to achieve those standards. Governance by the board is particu-
larly weak in NGO-MFIs in several respects. Firstly, accountability of board 
members is structurally weak due to the absence of clear ownership. Secondly, 
board members are often volunteers with social background and little know how 
in finance. Thirdly, management capture is the greatest vulnerability in MFIs with 
weak board governance. It happens often that a charismatic CEO or general man-
ager dominates the board, thus weakening the board’s oversight of the MFI and 
the board merely serving as a rubber stamp for the management.  
The opposite may also be the case where the board dominates governance, es-
pecially where charismatic founders are in the chair position. Such board may try to 
manage and not govern. Especially, when the management is perceived as weak the 
board may engage in operational issues – become a hands-on board as the other ex-
treme to the rubber-stamp board (Rock 1998) – and hence depart from its govern-
                                                          
15 Many of the greenfield banks had the same or a similar composition of DFI sharehold-
ers dubbed as “the usual suspects” which comprised KfW, IFC, EBRD, FMO and EIB. 
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ance function of setting the policy and strategic framework. One of the most im-
portant and delicate tasks in creating good governance is to achieve a proper bal-
ance of functions between the board and management, avoiding either board or 
management capture (CMEF 2012).  
Again, equity investors have an important role in strengthening governance 
through active engagement on the board. A key function of the board is the defini-
tion and subsequent implementation of the organization’s mission. DFIs have had 
a pioneering role by appointing representatives to the boards of MFIs whose pri-
mary concern has been to keep the organization oriented towards the double bot-
tom line of social and financial returns. Their role within these boards is almost 
like that of an “activist” constantly working for a dual social and financial objec-
tive (Laude 2009). 
Setting the responsible finance agenda has become another important topic for 
the board room. In the wake of some recent excesses and local crises, MFI boards 
need to provide policy guidance to management on thorny issues such as respon-
sible portfolio growth, transparent pricing and balanced returns. This includes also 
a debate about overheated markets or market segments in an increasingly competi-
tive environment and the formulation of an appropriate response strategy. In a re-
cent research (MCKee 2012), CGAP found the hot button strategic decisions in 
the boardroom of MFIs surprisingly consistent among a diverse pool of interview-
ees (see Box below). 
Which Decisions Are Reported to Generate the Most Controversy in the 
Board Room? 
x How fast to grow and where  
x Which new products to offer and which client segments to prioritize  
x How to price products and ensure long-term client protection 
x What profit targets are appropriate and how should profits be allocated  
x What level of executive remuneration is appropriate 
x How to handle capital increases, entry of new owners, and responsible exit  
x How to handle crisis 
Source: McKee 2012 
With the growing diversification of the funding landscape, the investors’ role 
and influence in the governance of microfinance is shifting from DFIs to inter-
mediaries like MIVs and holdings. Recent research by CGAP (McKee 2012) 
found that MIVs and holdings today assume 208 (64 %) out of 325 board seats, 
with DFIs taking 29 % or 93 board seats. The research concludes that equity in-
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vestors are not fully capitalizing on the opportunity to strengthen MFI govern-
ance. It concluded that investors should (i) more actively engage in and beyond 
the board room, (ii) ensure adequate qualifications, time commitment and conti-
nuity of their board nominees, and (iii) increase efforts towards aligning share-
holder interests. It seems that the new investors have some way to go to step into 
the DFIs’ shoes, to fully assume responsibilities as actively engaged board 
members and to live up to the expectations associated with their role as active 
promoters of good corporate governance. 
This then raises the question of corporate governance at the next higher level, 
i.e. the MIVs and their private fund managers, where essentially the same princi-
ples and crucial governance issues apply. Apart from anecdotal evidence, little in-
sight is available on the governance in over 115 MIVs. The EFSE, for example, 
has developed and adopted comprehensive guidelines on good corporate govern-
ance. The MIV surveys make an attempt to capture ESG aspects but only two in-
dicators focus on governance, transparency and anti-corruption policy. Accord-
ingly, 86 % of MIVs report on ESG aspects to their investors and 84 % of MIVs 
apply anti-corruption and/or internal whistleblowing policies to their invest-
ments (Symbiotics 2012).  
4.5 Responsible Exit Strategies 
The double bottom line in microfinance introduces the dimension of equity inves-
tors’ responsibility with regard to exit strategies. Two aspects are particularly rele-
vant in this regard: the timing of the exit and how to preserve the mission after exit. 
When is the right time for an exit from a MFI? There is no universal answer to 
this question as it differs for different investors. Intuitively, it should neither be too 
early nor too late. The risk of a too early exit is associated primarily with private 
commercial investors who tend to have a short-term investment horizon. To mitigate 
this risk, some shareholder agreements will include a “lock up clause” that prevents 
shareholders from exiting within a pre-determined period, eg. five years. This en-
sures that shareholders in ad advance agree to remain vested in the mission of the 
MFI for a longer time horizon (CMEF 2012). Exit provisions also help to protect 
minority shareholders and to maintain a continuity of like-minded ownership. Key 
exit issues should be anticipated and negotiated early in the shareholders’ agree-
ment. With DFI shareholders rather the opposite is the case: as patient investors they 
tend to exit later than initially anticipated. While this may not pose a risk to the re-
spective investee but it prevents precious DFI equity capital being recycled to other 
MFIs. In this regard, the gradual exit of DFIs in the greenfield model from retail 
MFIs and the consolidation at the holding level is a first important step.  
The other challenge of microfinance exits is the need to preserve the social mis-
sion. DFIs are particularly concerned, given the amount and effort invested in the 
institution, to sell their stake to carefully selected investors. Some socially respon-
sible investors may prefer to exit by selling their shares to other socially responsi-
ble investors, even at lower return (CMEF 2012). Therefore, investor screening 
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and selection constitutes a key element of responsible exit strategies. Selection cri-
teria would include their objectives and mission, risk and return expectations, in-
vestment horizon, ownership structure, integrity and reputation, and their track re-
cord in microfinance. 
4.6 Promoting Good Corporate Governance: Whose Role in the Future? 
The changing landscape of microfinance funding is naturally bringing a change in 
roles of different funders. MIVs and their private managers as well as the holding 
companies are increasingly taking the driver seats in the governance of MFIs. 
DFIs are taking the back seats and continue to exert influence more indirectly 
through their stakes and board seats in the holdings and the MIVs. DFIs must 
make sure that MIVs and their representatives on the boards of MFIs are profes-
sionally and actively engaged. CGAP’s recent finding that most microfinance in-
vestors are not taking an active enough role should be taken as an early warning. 
The other element for promoting good governance in the future is strengthening 
the “sector governance” through investor coordination (e-MFP 2011). Lenders 
groups and other peer groups may play a more active role in setting standards and 
defining codes for the industry. It is encouraging that most of the principles and 
guidelines on corporate governance, previously the domain of DFIs, come from 
such peer groups and industry associations.  
Most crucial for future governance, however, is the growing importance of a 
completely stakeholder group, the local savers and depositors who already are or 
will be the main funders of microfinance in the future. They are represented by the 
prudential regulators and supervisors in the respective countries. While regulators 
are generally aligned on principles and practices of corporate governance as they 
relate to the financial, fiduciary and prudential side, many of them are on a steep 
learning curve when it comes to social side and how to balance both sides under 
the microfinance industry’s double bottom line. This opens a new dimension for 
promoting good corporate governance in the future. 
5 Outlook: The Microfinance Funding Landscape of Tomorrow 
The paper has illustrated the microfinance landscape today and its evolution in the 
past years. It has identified some main trends and some of these will gain momen-
tum in the future.  
5.1 Further Decreasing Public Funds and Subsidies for Microfinance 
The role of public funders in microfinance will further decrease, particularly in the 
field of debt financing and with it the amount of truly public funds and subsidies 
while private investors, mostly socially responsible investors, are likely to further 
increase their presence and commitment to the sector.  
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This trend implies that the scarce public resources should be employed in a 
highly effective manner. This implies two things: (i) to maximize the leverage of 
public funds and (ii) to use subsidies in a highly targeted and “smart” way. For 
example, employing scarce public funds as first loss tranches in structured funds 
or similar public-private-partnership arrangements can create a significant lever-
age. When such structure is further enhanced through mezzanine finance from 
DFIs the risk threshold is lowered to a level that is attractive for private investors, 
or that is even acceptable to more commercial institutional investors, thus pushing 
the frontier even further.  
Creating conducive frameworks through capacity building at sector and macro 
levels have probably the highest leverage as will enable the private sector to flourish. 
A lot of work is to be done in many countries to make regulations conducive to mi-
crofinance, to introduce secured transactions frameworks including collateral regis-
tries, to establish or open up credit bureaus for micro borrowers, to name a few ac-
tivities where public subsidies should be targeted in a smart and effective way. 
Going forward, therefore the allocation of public funds for microfinance should 
be critically scrutinized in terms of their leverage and additionality effects. 
5.2 Ongoing Trend Towards Increased Local Funding: Local Deposits 
and Capital Markets 
The issue of financial inclusion has been put on the agenda of high-level fora such 
as the G20 and of many national governments. More and more countries are ex-
pected to enact conducive laws and regulations to allow for deposit-taking MFIs. 
This will enable many more MFIs to offer a whole range of services to clients be-
yond microcredit, especially savings. There are many more potential savers than 
potential borrowers among the 2.7 billion poor of this world. Recent research on 
the state of the microfinance industry concludes that the latent demand for micro-
credit seems to be limited and the actual gap in serving the poor is much smaller 
than the estimates frequently put forward (Lützenkirchen and Weistoffer 2012).  
What is the ideal share of local versus cross-border funding over time? The ex-
perience of the most successful microfinance institutions clearly shows that loan 
portfolios – which are mostly short-term – can over time be entirely funded by local 
deposits. Building inclusive and sustainable financial systems is about fostering fi-
nancial intermediation rather than channeling of cross-border funds. Therefore, the 
role of cross-border funders for the refinancing of microcredit portfolios will clearly 
diminish. Their market niche will shrink to those countries where MFIs are not per-
mitted to accept local deposits. And even there, as the cases of India or Morocco 
demonstrate, the local financial institutions with their comparative advantage of lo-
cal currency financing will likely pick up a larger share in the future.  
What role then for the private social investors that have entered the microfi-
nance field with so much enthusiasm and appetite? They will need to seek addi-
tionality by offering different instruments such as equity, subordinated debt and 
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other hybrid forms of risk capital (see below). If their mandate allows, they should 
also look into longer-term loans to refinance e.g. investment loans to very small 
and small enterprises, so far the domain of DFIs. Many of these enterprises have 
graduated from the microenterprise segment and require loan amounts above the 
microfinance threshold and longer tenors. Most of the greenfield banks are already 
serving these clients and many existing MFIs look into upscaling into the small 
enterprise market.  
In most countries, local capital markets are highly underdeveloped and in a 
nascent state. This holds true for both bond and equity markets. Cross-border fun-
ders have an important role in filling the gap but also in catalyzing local capital 
market transactions and building local bond and equity markets.  
5.3 Increasing Trend Towards Equity and Other Forms of Risk Capital  
The current trend towards equity and other forms of risk capital will further in-
crease. From 2008 to 2011, MIVs have doubled the share of equity financing in 
their overall funding from 12 % to 23 % while the share of debt declined to 76 % 
(Luminis 2012). The rising demand for equity is a reflection of the ongoing trans-
formation of NGO-MFIs into for-profit companies and microfinance banks. Banks 
and other deposit-taking institutions per se have higher minimum capital and capi-
tal adequacy requirements. Moreover, the recently established microfinance hold-
ings plan to establish at least two additional greenfield banks per year which will 
create a surge in capital. But also other forms of risk capital will be required such 
as mezzanine finance or subordinated loans, e.g. in regulatory regimes that ac-
knowledge sub-debt as tier-2 capital, and other hybrid instruments. 
5.4 Working Towards Complementarity Between Public and Private 
Funders 
As the market for cross-border funders will narrow down, particularly in the field 
of debt finance, and become more focused, the likelihood of overlaps of different 
types of investors will also increase. Yet it is important to acknowledge the differ-
ent roles played by the purely public funders, the DFIs, the MIVs and the private 
social investors, with a view to foster more differentiation and complementarity. 
What comparative advantages do different funders bring to the table? What do pri-
vate investors expect from public funders and DFIs, and vice versa, what do MFIs 
and public funders expect from private investors? A constructive debate among the 
different funders on these issues would help pave the way to greater complementar-
ity in a market which – in any case – will be increasingly covered by local funders 
and local deposits and where cross-border funders will have to sharpen the addi-
tionality of their respective offers.  
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5.5 What Future Role for DFls?  
As outlined earlier, DFIs will continue to have a role to play in the future as cata-
lysts and match-makers but also in capacity building, especially at the macro and 
sector levels, and in promoting high standards in areas like corporate governance 
or responsible finance. What will change is the level of engagement. The current 
trend of DFIs working increasingly through intermediaries such as MIVs and 
holdings will likely gain further momentum and the tendency of working directly 
with retail MFIs will likely diminish. DFIs will operate more indirectly – from the 
back seat – while MIVs and private investors will be more in the driving seat.  
DFIs will maintain additionality in funding by providing financing instruments, 
for example subordinate and mezzanine finance, guarantees and other enhance-
ment products, as long as these products are not offered by private investors. Fi-
nally, there is a key role of DFIs in building local capital and bond markets to al-
low such products to be offered locally in the medium and long term. While some 
of these products may seem overly sophisticated for microfinance today they are 
an important building block of an inclusive financial system in the future. 
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